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 Sensing an opportunity to woo an interest group that had long been hostile toward the 
Republican Party, President Richard Nixon extended a bold invitation for the evening of 
September 7, 1970: he invited labor movement leaders to the White House for a Labor Day 
dinner. For decades, the partnership between organized labor and civil rights groups was the 
backbone of a powerful coalition that routinely helped Democrats win control of the White 
House and maintain strong majorities in Congress. But, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, after a 
decade of social upheaval and transformational social reforms, the Democratic coalition was 
falling apart. The rupturing of Democratic alliances was no secret to the political establishment 
or to the leaders of the groups that were abandoning a once formidable partnership. In an 
interview before attending the 1970 Labor Day dinner at the White House, George Meany, 
President of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-
CIO), the largest federation of labor unions in the United States, admitted that ‘“the Democratic 
Party ha[d] disintegrated.”’1 As an astute political observer, Nixon sensed an opportunity to court 
the labor movement—a constituency he had long viewed as a foe—and convince them to join a 
burgeoning “Silent Majority” that would secure Republican electoral dominance in future 
elections. Meany was aware of Nixon’s motivations, but he was also aware of a once strong 
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coalition’s declining clout—he knew the bonds that had kept the Democratic Party in power for 
the better part of the previous half-century were withering away.  
 President Nixon’s efforts to take advantage of the deepening fissure between the labor 
movement and civil rights groups, however, did not end with a dinner invitation, nor did they 
begin in 1970. Soon after defeating Hubert Humphrey in the 1968 Presidential election, newly 
elected President Nixon began to formulate his civil rights policy, and began advocating for the 
implementation of a revised Philadelphia Plan—a targeted effort to boost the hiring of minority 
workers by Philadelphia-area contractors. President Lyndon B. Johnson had devised his own 
version of the Philadelphia Plan, but never implemented it. Then, in mid-1969, the Nixon 
Administration began to examine Johnson’s plan, and ultimately decided to launch a new version 
in September 1969, mere months after Nixon assumed the Presidency. Nixon’s Philadelphia Plan 
required contractors performing federally funded projects to set goals and timetables to ensure 
the increased hiring of minority workers. Contractors were obliged to meet these targets, or at 
least show a good faith effort to comply with the policy.  
Although the historical literature effectively analyzes Nixon’s political motivations for 
endorsing the Philadelphia Plan, historians have neglected to analyze the roots of union 
opposition to, and civil rights groups’ support of, the Philadelphia Plan. Why did two closely 
aligned interest groups take diametrically opposed stances toward one of President Nixon’s most 
important and controversial domestic policy initiatives? And, why did the labor movement and 
the civil rights movement both decide that advocating on behalf of their respective constituencies 
would yield more benefits than collaborating to preserve an influential and powerful political 
coalition?  
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Both the civil rights movement and the labor movement knew that Nixon’s advocacy of a 
revised Philadelphia Plan was at least partly rooted in political opportunism—a chance to break 
an already damaged bond between two groups with a vested interest in returning the Democratic 
Party to power. However, even Nixon did not realize the depth of the animosity and mistrust that 
already existed between labor and civil rights groups in the late 1960s. And, by the time Nixon 
introduced his revised Philadelphia Plan, both camps had already concluded that the alliance was 
broken beyond repair. Instead of fighting to preserve a coalition that was already fully ruptured, 
civil rights and labor leaders planned their respective support of, and opposition to, the 
Philadelphia Plan, with a singular goal in mind: protecting the interests of their members and 
constituents. Civil rights leaders were frustrated with what they viewed as the deeply rooted 
racial discrimination that tainted the labor movement’s progressive goals of fighting for worker’s 
rights. African Americans bemoaned a hierarchical seniority structure that reduced black union 
membership, and they criticized seemingly fruitless and insincere efforts made by the labor 
movement to correct systematic and entrenched racial injustice. The Philadelphia Plan, therefore, 
was a gift to black workers—an opportunity to force unwilling union leaders to admit African 
Americans into their ranks. In contrast, organized labor scoffed at the notion that in the post-
Civil Rights Act era they maintained a system of racial injustice. Meany and other labor leaders 
emphasized training programs that the labor movement had developed to help cultivate skilled 
black workers. But, to labor leaders and rank-and-file union members, the Philadelphia Plan was 
nothing more than an unconstitutional, government-imposed quota system that would eradicate 
union culture and threaten the jobs of countless white union members.   
To answer my research questions, I consulted primary source documents in the George 
Meany Memorial Archives, located at Hornbake Library on the University of Maryland, College 
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Park campus. These archives are an exhaustive collection, but are only one part of a larger 
collection, the AFL-CIO archives, that are housed on the University of Maryland campus. I 
relied chiefly on correspondence from top AFL-CIO officials, including George Meany and Don 
Slaiman, Director of the AFL-CIO Civil Rights Division, correspondence from leading civil 
rights activists, newspaper articles from the early years of the President Nixon’s first term in 
office, and speeches delivered by labor, civil rights, and government officials.    
President Nixon’s Political Calculus  
 Frustrated with the inability of President Herbert Hoover and the Republican Party to 
remedy the perils of the Great Depression, Americans elected Franklin D. Roosevelt, a Democrat 
from New York, to the Presidency in 1932, ushering in almost four decades of virtually 
uninterrupted Democratic control of the White House and Congress.2  The Democratic Party 
assembled an unlikely coalition—a seemingly unbreakable bond between social conservatives in 
the solid South and economically progressive New Dealers. With the emergence of the Civil 
Rights Movement in the 1950s, two identifiable planks came to make up the core of the 
Democratic coalition: civil rights groups and the labor movement. This coalition represented a 
diverse segment of the American populace—African Americans fighting for racial justice, 
progressive whites who opposed both de facto and de jure segregation, and millions of blue-
collar workers who increasingly considered themselves part of the middle-class. However, with 
the ascension of Lyndon B. Johnson to the Presidency in 1963, and with the passage of both 
progressive civil rights legislation and sweeping social welfare programs, the Democratic 
coalition began to splinter.3 Southern whites who had ruled the solid South were alienated by the 
Democrats’ progressive stance on civil rights, just as many blue-collar workers felt alienated by 
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what they perceived to be overly intrusive and redistributive Great Society legislation.4 The 
evidence of this splintering was revealed in 1964, when Republican Presidential nominee Barry 
Goldwater swept the formerly Democratic South, and again in 1968, when third-party candidate 
George Wallace, the segregationist Governor of Alabama, attracted large support from 
“conservative Southern Democrat[s]…William Jennings Bryan-era Democratic 
populis[ts]…[and] urban Catholic[s]”—voters who “represented Democratic voting streams 
quitting their party.”5  
 With the splintering of the Democratic coalition in the late 1960s, the Nixon 
Administration and the Republican Party sought to seize the opportunity to bring formerly 
Democratic constituencies into the Republican fold. President Nixon and his staff even launched 
outreach efforts to constituencies very closely aligned with the progressive left, including 
African Americans. Although no complete plan or goal seemed to guide Nixon’s outreach to the 
black community—African Americans exhibited strong support for the Democratic Party after 
President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965—the 
Nixon Administration’s overtures to African Americans did not consist of only empty rhetoric, 
but were substantive.6 Even before his inauguration, Nixon met with a group of black leaders, 
“including Ralph Abernathy of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Dr. Nathan 
Wright, chair of the Black Power Conference,” and told them “that he would ‘do more for the 
underprivileged and more for the Negro than any President ha[d] ever done.’”7 Indeed, when he 
took office in 1969, Nixon established ‘“a single coordination point for matters pertaining to 
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minority affairs”’ in the White House.8 While African Americans seemed like an unlikely 
constituency to join Nixon’s “Silent Majority,” the President saw an opportunity: the Democratic 
Party coalition was falling apart, and its members needed somewhere to turn.  
 While political observers argued that outreach to African Americans was a fruitless effort 
to recruit voters uninterested in supporting the Republican Party, by espousing policies that 
benefitted the black community, including the Philadelphia Plan, Nixon knowingly drove a 
wedge between black Americans and the labor movement—two pillars of the Democratic 
coalition. Richard Nixon believed that the Philadelphia Plan could be used not only as a way to 
increase minority hiring, but to split the Democratic coalition and help build a new Republican 
electoral majority. Although both the civil rights movement and the labor movement had long 
been supporters of the Democratic Party, Nixon understood that much of organized labor was 
eager to move past 1960s liberalism, and harbored a more culturally conservative ideology that 
did not mesh with many of the goals of the civil rights movement. Unions, therefore, would 
surely oppose government efforts to impose minority hiring goals on Philadelphia-area 
contractors, and this opposition would certainly appear to civil rights leaders as an affront to 
minority workers. In Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class, Jefferson 
Cowie, Professor of Labor History at Cornell University, argues that Nixon’s endorsement of the 
Philadelphia Plan “probably had more to do with outflanking the liberals…than anything else,” 
and that Nixon believed the plan would “help foment the conflict between two core constituents 
of the New Deal coalition—labor and blacks.”9 Similarly, Nelson Lichtenstein, Professor at the 
University of California, Santa Barbara, argues in his book, State of the Union: A Century of 
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American Labor, that one of the chief purposes of the Philadelphia Plan was to “drive a wedge 
between the unions and the civil rights community.”10 Lichtenstein explains that AFL-CIO 
leaders were themselves representative of a culturally conservative generation that “battled 
communism,” experienced “great internal difficulty when it came to confronting embedded 
patterns of racial discrimination” in its ranks.11 While the AFL-CIO expressed public support for 
the civil rights acts of the early 1960s, it refused to support the 1963 March on Washington and 
viewed many affirmative action programs as a threat to seniority—a “part of the moral economy 
of the work regime…representing the most important ‘property’ interest a worker held in his 
job.”12 Both Lichtenstein and Cowie argue that Nixon recognized the roots of labor’s opposition 
to affirmative action, and the movement’s increasingly fragile relationship with civil rights 
leaders, and therefore advocated for the Philadelphia Plan to exacerbate these tensions.  
An Unreciprocated Desire to Remain United 
 Understanding the importance of the Democratic coalition to achieving substantive policy 
successes that would benefit African Americans, civil rights leaders harbored a strong desire to 
try and salvage their relationship with the labor movement in the late 1960s. Even after President 
Nixon’s outreach to the African American community at the beginning of his Presidency, civil 
rights leadership still viewed the new Republican White House as a foe. Black leaders believed 
that a continued partnership with the labor movement was essential to being able to effectively 
fight for progressive policy while a Republican occupied the White House. In a 1968 letter to 
George Meany, Roy Wilkins, Chairman of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, said that 
with “the new Administration and the new Congress…it [is] imperative that we strengthen and 
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expand our collective efforts.”13 Wilkins believed that the partnership with labor had been a 
successful one, encompassing “efforts on behalf of minimum wage, guaranteed jobs, [National 
Labor Relations Board] coverage for farm labor, housing, and education”14 After extolling the 
benefits of the partnership between civil rights and labor, Wilkins made his yearly plea to Meany 
for a financial contribution from the AFL-CIO to be placed in the coffers of the Leadership 
Conference on Civil Rights.15 Only a few months after sending this letter to Meany, in August 
1969 Wilkins once again solicited a financial donation from the AFL-CIO,16 only to request 
another contribution the following year in September 1970.17 In his letters, Wilkins routinely 
praised the bonds between civil rights leadership and the labor movement— insisting that 
together they could “deal with the growing complexity of social and economic issues that 
confront all of us working for full equality.”18 In contrast, while Meany would always enclose 
checks in his responses to Wilkins,19 his responses to Wilkins were short and curt, revealing an 
unreciprocated desire to strengthen the partnership between the AFL-CIO and civil rights 
leaders.20  
 While the civil rights movement’s progressive policy goals had little in common with 
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Nixon’s conservative ideology, rank-and-file union members did find common ground with 
Nixon, and therefore felt less insecure about the prospect of a shattering Democratic coalition. In 
addition to being Vietnam war hawks, many rank-and-file union members aligned culturally with 
President Nixon—they were disillusioned with the women’s rights and civil rights movements 
that helped define the liberalism of the sixties and, were “tough, blunt, gutsy, and operat[ed] 
outside the political mainstream.”21 Many labor leaders and rank-and-file members who “seethed 
in resentment against liberals” felt a cultural link with the new President—desiring what they 
viewed as a restoration of law and order—even as the labor movement recognized the rift 
between their economic policy goals and Nixon’s espoused domestic policy priorities.22 While 
the civil rights movement viewed the Nixon Administration as a genuine threat to black progress, 
the labor movement approached the Nixon Administration cautiously, skeptical of the new 
President’s economic policies, but excited to inaugurate a President who would eradicate the 
liberal consensus. Wilkins’ letters to Meany, and Meany’s responses, therefore, can be situated 
in a useful historical context: whereas Wilkins felt intense pressure to maintain an alliance that 
could combat Nixon’s policies, Meany was less eager to invest heavily in saving a partnership 
that seemed doomed to collapse.  
 Eruption of Anger and a Dying Coalition  
 Although civil rights leaders harbored deeply rooted anxieties about the fate of racial 
progress under a conservative Nixon White House, and therefore desperately wanted to maintain 
a working alliance with the labor movement, even before the Philadelphia Plan was passed, civil 
rights leaders began to express anger toward the discriminatory practices of labor unions. At the 
1968 Convention of the United Steelworkers of America in Chicago, Illinois, members of a 
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nationwide caucus of black steelworkers handed out a series of leaflets bemoaning what they 
viewed as racist practices perpetuated by the labor unions.23 In these leaflets, members of the 
caucus argued that “‘the time has come for black workers to speak and act for ourselves. We 
make no apologies for the fact that we as black workers and loyal trade unionists now act on our 
own behalf. Furthermore we are fully prepared to do so.’”24 These caucus members did not view 
their message as a baseless request; rather they believed that unity among black workers was 
essential to protecting African Americans against the discriminatory practices of labor unions. 
According to one of the leaflets distributed by caucus members: 
‘“The present director of the AFL-CIO Civil Rights Department [Donald 
Slaiman] has no involvement with Negro workers and their problems. He does not 
know of our problems. He does not represent us. He does not act in our interests. 
We believe we speak for many thousands of Negro workers not only in the 
Steelworkers Union but in other AFL-CIO affiliates with large Negro 
memberships when we demand the replacement of a white paternalist with a 
Black trade unionist.”’25 
 
Herbert Hill, Labor Director for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP), echoed the sentiments of the caucus members, and foreshadowed the coming 
conflict between the labor movement and African Americans fighting for equality in the 
workplace: “The racial intransigence and insensitivity of many labor unions to the interests of the 
black community and to the increasing radicalization of Negro demands suggest sharp 
confrontations in the near future.”26 
 While African Americans did indeed vocalize their frustration with, and anger toward the 
labor movement, this proclamation of grievances did not exist in isolation, but rather led to the 
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formation of independent black unions. Frustrated with the “adamant resistance of organized 
labor to Negro demands for fundamental changes in racial policies and practices,” Herbert Hill 
argued that several “black unions and black caucuses with unions” developed to illustrate that 
black workers were committed to fighting for what they believed to be fundamental rights that 
labor unions were denying them.27 These independent black unions, which sprung up all over the 
country in the late 1960s and early 1970s, were unaffiliated with umbrella union organizations 
such as the AFL-CIO and represented workers who engaged in a wide array of different trades. 
These independent unions included: The Independent Alliance of Skilled Crafts in Ohio, the 
Maryland Freedom Labor Union, the United Community Construction Workers of Boston, the 
United Construction and Trade Union in Detroit, the Allied Workers International Union in 
Gary, and comparable groups in Seattle, Chicago, and Oakland. Moreover, “in several cities, 
including Detroit, Philadelphia, and Chicago, sharp differences…developed between Negro 
teachers and the American Federation of Teachers on educational issues vital to the Negro 
community.”28 Consequently, black teachers organized, forming independent teachers unions 
and black caucuses in many cities across the country.29 The emergence of independent black 
unions—and even the development of black caucuses within preexisting trade unions—
accentuates the frustrations felt by many African American workers in the late 1960s. These 
workers believed that to achieve equal treatment in the workplace they could no longer rely on 
the existing labor union structure, but instead had to form their own entities that could advocate 
on behalf of oppressed black workers. Indeed, “the growth of [black unions and caucuses] attests 
to their appeal to two groups of black workers: those Negroes who live and work in ghetto areas 
where AFL unions make no attempt to organize and those Negroes in the building trades who, 
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having been denied admission to AFL-CIO craft unions, are attracted to black-controlled hiring 
halls.”30 Even AFL-CIO officials, including Don Slaiman, expressed concern that Black Power 
was infiltrating the labor movement, a consequence he attributed to the unhappiness of black 
union members.31 
 Just as the formation of independent black labor unions in the 1960s reveals the tangible 
results of black anger toward the labor movement, the proliferation of litigation in the 1960s—
cases protesting the treatment of black workers in the workplace—reveals that African 
Americans were beginning to feel compelled to take proactive steps to mitigate the effects of a 
perceived racist and impenetrably hierarchical labor union structure. For example, in his address 
to the Sixty-First Annual NAACP Convention in Cincinnati, Ohio, Herbert Hill spoke at length 
about the implications of a landmark case sponsored by the NAACP, Ethridge v. Rhodes, that he 
believed established legal principles that undergirded the rationale for issuing the revised 
Philadelphia Plan.32 The aforementioned case “arose after two Negro craftsmen in Columbus, 
Ohio had unsuccessfully attempted to join local crafts unions and had been told by contractors 
that union membership was a prerequisite for employment in their companies.”33 Therefore, by 
denying the black craftsmen union membership, the union was effectively denying them 
opportunities for employment. Moreover, the “State of Ohio…waived provisions of the 
Governor’s executive order designed to ensure equal job opportunities for Negros.”34 After 
hearing about the unfortunate fate of black workers in Ohio, the NAACP decided to sponsor a 
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class-action lawsuit, revealing the commitment of the NAACP to eradicating discrimination 
within labor unions. By bringing suit, the NAACP also revealed its belief that it could not end 
what it believed to be the racist practices of labor unions by only working with unions and 
attempting to persuade them to alter their practices; rather, civil rights leaders believed that to 
promote fairer employment practices, they needed to rely on the courts.  
 Just as the vocalization of anger by civil rights groups toward labor unions, the formation 
of independent black unions, and the proliferation of litigation aimed at ending discriminatory 
labor practices all signaled a belief among civil rights leaders that the alliance between civil 
rights groups and organized labor was broken beyond repair, by the late-1960s, the labor 
movement also believed that the Democratic coalition was unsalvageable. Indeed, when 
President Nixon proposed the revised Philadelphia Plan in late-1969, labor movement leaders 
understood that many of their typical allies—progressive Democrats who supported civil rights 
efforts—would support Nixon’s efforts. However, the AFL-CIO was more concerned with 
protecting the interests of union members, and maintaining the integrity of union culture than 
with appeasing their allies in Congress, even if this meant delivering a deathblow to their alliance 
with progressive advocates for civil rights. Instead of working with the labor movement and with 
legislators committed to protecting minorities in the workplace, the AFL-CIO joined forces with 
unlikely allies who often vehemently opposed the ideals and practices of the labor movement—
“Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans”— to “[drum] up votes against the Nixon 
Administration’s ‘Philadelphia Plan’ to provide more construction jobs for Negroes.”35 The 
AFL-CIO was not embarrassed that they were courting traditional foes “like Sen. Barry 
Goldwater of Arizona and Sen. Peter H. Dominick of Colorado [who were] almost never found 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Stanley Levey, “AFL-CIO Lobby Labors in Vain: How AFL-CIO Lost of Philly Plan,” The Pittsburgh 
Press, December 23, 1969, box 35, folder 2, The George Meany Memorial Archives, Office of the President, 
George Meany Files, 1956-1980, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland.   
Kramer 14 
on labor’s side.”36 Instead, by saying that “‘when we lobby, we lobby with all members,’” labor 
leaders expressed pride in their ability to court Senators who had not only long opposed 
collective bargaining rights, but who staunchly opposed efforts made by civil rights groups to 
boost minority hiring in the workplace.37  
 In addition to courting unlikely allies in their effort to kill the Philadelphia Plan, by 
adamantly opposing the revised Philadelphia Plan even though they were aware of Nixon’s 
political motives for introducing it—to drive a wedge between labor and civil rights—the labor 
movement revealed its belief that the Democratic coalition was broken, and that attempts at 
preserving the coalition were not worth sacrificing important legislative goals. The American 
Labor Life Insurance Company, in its January 1970 “Labor Letter Newsletter”—a newsletter 
described by the company as “a service to our clients…America’s union members”—explained 
that according to the AFL-CIO, “Nixon’s support of the Philadelphia Plan [was an] attempt to 
drive a wedge between labor and minorities, and [to] cover for [a] GOP strategy to woo the south 
by appeasing segregationists.”38 George Meany even asserted that the revised Philadelphia Plan 
was merely “a ‘concoction and contrivance of a bureaucrat’s imagination’ used to win the Nixon 
administration a few ‘Brownie points’ [with civil rights groups] to offset its bad civil rights 
record.”39 The basis for the labor movement’s knowledge of Nixon’s political motivations was 
not sheer speculation, but rather admission from sources within the Nixon White House. By late-
1969, just after the Nixon Administration released the revised Philadelphia Plan, some people 
“who worked on the President’s team [said] that they were skeptical of his motives. They did not 
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doubt…his commitment to minority employment, but they…privately suggested that he might 
have sensed political profit in pitting the civil rights movement against its natural allies in the 
labor movement.”40 Labor leaders knew that a politically deft President was plotting to pit them 
against their traditional allies. They knew the choice was clear: work with civil rights leaders to 
craft a plan acceptable to both constituencies in the Democratic coalition, or pursue their own 
self-interests, thereby guaranteeing the success of Nixon’s political motives. Ultimately, the 
labor movement chose the latter, abandoning any efforts to save their alliance with civil rights 
groups, and instead exhausting their resources to doom the revised Philadelphia Plan to defeat.  
 While the issuance of the revised Philadelphia Plan helped expose the cleavages that 
divided organized labor and the civil rights movement, these divisions were not sudden, but 
rather reflected a deeply rooted ideological divide between the core constituencies of each 
interest group. In a December 1969 article in the New York Times, reporter John Herbers traced 
the relationship between Clarence M. Mitchell, Washington Director of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People, and Andrew J. Biemiller, chief lobbyist for the AFL-
CIO, as a way of illustrating the fracturing of the labor-civil rights alliance.41 Although these two 
men both represented core elements of the civil rights lobby that “helped achieve landmark civil 
rights legislation throughout the [1960s],” by the end of the 1960s, they represented 
organizations with divergent views on Nixon’s revised Philadelphia Plan.42 This divergence “was 
a manifestation of a deeper division between the constituencies of the two men,” and a reflection 
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of the “differences between the constituencies of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations.”43 
During the Johnson Administration, “the Democrats, with the coalition of urban interests, the 
poor and intellectuals, were able to move on a broad front in civil rights, but were so closely 
aligned with the labor organizations that they were reluctant to move with force against one of 
the strongholds of discrimination, the building trades.”44 However, “the Nixon Administration, 
with its white, middle-class suburban base of support, is less attuned to civil rights in general but 
has no ties to prevent a movement against the labor unions.”45 Consequently, according to 
Herbers, the Democratic coalition did not stick together during the Johnson Administration 
because its members saw eye-to-eye on most issues. Rather, President Johnson orchestrated 
several compromises between the civil rights movement and organized labor that helped preserve 
the coalition. For example, Johnson helped convince civil rights groups not to attack the building 
trades in exchange for a promise from organized labor to support civil rights legislation. Johnson 
knew that to succeed legislatively and electorally, Democrats needed both organized labor and 
the civil rights movement on the same team; so, he forged backroom deals to placate both sides. 
However, because President Nixon’s political support was not derived from either union 
members or civil rights activists, Nixon had no incentive to preserve the Democratic coalition, 
but instead thought it in his interest to destroy it. The maintenance of the labor-civil rights 
alliance during the Johnson years, and its abrupt collapse during the Nixon years suggests that 
what held the Democratic coalition together was not common interests or shared goals, but rather 
shrewd political calculations by the Johnson White House. Thus, when the former allies were 
faced with a stark choice during the early Nixon years—whether to support or oppose the revised 
Philadelphia Plan—both groups chose individual group interests over preserving the Democratic 
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coalition.  
Labor: Roots of Opposition 
 Although organized labor freely recognized that union practices did formerly involve 
discriminatory practices that adversely affected minority workers, by the 1960s union leaders 
expressed a belief that while certain small steps still needed to be taken to guarantee equal 
employment opportunities for minorities, the labor movement had already made substantial 
progress toward including black workers. In a speech honoring the eightieth birthday of A. 
Phillip Randolph, a famed civil rights leader who helped organize the 1963 March on 
Washington, George Meany acknowledged that “the trade union movement played a role in the 
pattern of discrimination and exploitation that marked the industrial life of our country in years 
gone by.”46 However, Meany claimed that while “the trade union movement still ha[d] a job to 
do if it [wa]s to completely remove the specter of race discrimination from its ranks…it [was] 
not infrequent…to find unions and civil rights leaders working together to bring the benefits of 
unionism to the most exploited Negro.”47 Certain concrete steps, such as helping improve “the 
skills of the Negro worker,” could be taken by the labor movement to help boost minority hiring, 
argued Meany, but this should not cloud the progress that the labor movement had already made 
toward ensuring equal treatment in the workplace.48 The Philadelphia Plan, which imposed 
minority hiring goals on Philadelphia-area contractors, represented massive government 
overreach, designed to cure a problem that, according to organized labor, was already well on its 
way to being fixed.  
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 In addition to addressing a problem that was already being steadily fixed, the labor 
movement argued that the Philadelphia Plan imposed an unrealistic burden on Philadelphia-area 
contractors—obliging them to hire African Americans even when most prospective minority 
workers did not have the training necessary to make effective employees. At a Press Conference 
following an AFL-CIO Executive Council Meeting in August 1970, George Meany explained 
that the Philadelphia Plan was fundamentally flawed because “contractor[s] ha[d] no labor 
supply of [their] own,” and they had “no way of creat[ing] or develop[ing] a labor supply.”49 
Contractors, according to labor leaders, had no way of meeting minority hiring goals because 
there were simply not enough trained black workers available for hire. Don Slaiman, at a 1970 
Labor Department Panel, explained that the real reason for low levels of minority employment 
within labor unions was not overt discrimination, but rather because there were not enough 
qualified African Americans to work.50 Slaiman argued that the Philadelphia Plan was based on a 
false premise: “that there were outside of the union thousands of already qualified [workers] in 
these trades who weren’t in the union. The government said so. But they can’t produce them.”51 
Because it provided no means to train minority workers, “the Philadelphia Plan provide[d] no 
means for achieving [its] ranges or quotas. It surely d[id] not indicate at all how minority 
workers c[ould] become part of the permanent work force in those unions whose small minority 
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membership the plan seem[ed] to be directed toward increasing.”52 Thus, organized labor viewed 
the Plan not as a sincere effort to boost minority hiring, but as an “ill-conceived political 
gimmick” that would force employers to hire droves of unqualified workers.53    
 Organized labor’s opposition to the Philadelphia Plan was not simply defined by a chorus 
of complaints; rather, they argued that the labor movement already had robust programs in place 
that offered prospective black union members opportunities to receive adequate training for an 
eclectic range of trades. Labor leaders maintained that they were committed to providing training 
opportunities to minorities, as evidenced by labor’s large-scale initiative: Operation Outreach. In 
August 1969 testimony delivered at a U.S. Department of Labor public hearing, James Loughlin, 
Business Manager of the AFL-CIO’s Building and Construction Trades Council of Philadelphia 
and Vicinity, described Operation Outreach as “a plan entered into by agreement between the 
government, the Building Trades Councils and other interested parties by which the use of 
government funded monies, minority or negro youth are recruited for purposes of preparation for 
apprenticeship training and it involves special efforts to bring such youth into existing 
apprenticeship training programs by affirmative action.”54 Labor leaders argued that as part of 
Operation Outreach, they also made genuine attempts to reach out to federal officials, including 
John Wilkes, Director of the Labor Department’s Office of Federal Compliance, to secure 
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government support for the program.55 In testimony at a Labor Department public hearing about 
the revised Philadelphia Plan, Loughlin touted Operation Outreach’s successes:  
“In Philadelphia, for the sum of $59,000 the original goal set by the agreement with the 
government for the year 1968-1969 was the bringing in of fifty such youth. The goal was 
revised to sixty. The initial goal has been exceeded by some thirty-three and the results of 
Operation Outreach have been to bring into apprenticeship training programs throughout 
the crafts some eighty-three Negro youth who were recruited for this purpose.”56 
 
Loughlin, however, was not the only AFL-CIO official to cite the success of Operation Outreach 
as a way of justifying organized labor’s opposition to the revised Philadelphia Plan. In a 
February 1970 press conference, George Meany argued that the revised Philadelphia Plan “could 
never do anything to solve the problem [of low minority employment] because the problem has 
got to be solved by getting black youngsters into the trades. Getting them trained, the same as we 
are doing through ‘Operation Outreach.’”57 Even reporter Stanley Levey, a noted and widely 
respected American journalist, wrote that the AFL-CIO used its outreach programs as 
justification for opposing the Philadelphia Plan: 
“The AFL-CIO takes the position that the Administration Plan is an ‘unrealistic 
and unfeasible’ way of doing the job. It contends that construction unions are 
doing it better through a so-called ‘outreach program’ that have been in operation 
for three years in cooperation with the Labor Dept., the Urban League and other 
various other groups working in the civil rights and social welfare fields. Under 
the outreach program, the building unions seek out, train and counsel minority 
group members in the skills, aptitudes, and attitudes necessary to become an 
apprentice in one of the construction trades.”58 
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Levey, in a Washington Daily News article published in July 1969, even corroborated organized 
labor’s claims that Operation Outreach had yielded some successes, noting that by mid-1969 the 
program had effectively trained 3,400 new black apprentices.59 Only through these training 
efforts, labor officials argued, could black workers be effectively trained, and thus be truly 
empowered. As Don Slaiman noted: “one cannot make skilled journeymen with a magic wand. 
Perhaps, maybe mathematical formulas can be concocted to beat a roulette wheel. There is no 
numbers game that can make instant journeymen.”60 
 While organized labor’s opposition to the revised Philadelphia Plan was indeed partly 
rooted in its belief that the plan forced employers to hire untrained workers, labor leaders also 
argued that the plan would obliterate traditional union culture, threatening the seniority and 
apprenticeship systems that had long been so central to union ethos. Even before Nixon officially 
released his plan, the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Building and Construction Trades Council 
authored a resolution condemning the plan for failing to protect the integrity of union culture. 
The resolution claimed that the plan  would “lower established wage rates, conditions, and 
standards of employment earned during many years of sacrifice and effort,” and would “defeat or 
demoralize apprenticeship training as established by so very many years of experience, trial and 
error and which is so important in the development of qualified skilled craftsmen necessary in 
building construction.”61 Thus, instead of requiring prospective employees to attend years of 
apprenticeship training, and rewarding workers who committed themselves to mastering their 
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trade, the Philadelphia Plan destroyed this culture, and permitted untrained and unskilled 
employees to receive the same benefits as workers who spent years practicing their trade. 
Moreover, union leaders begrudged what they viewed as an inevitable consequence of Nixon’s 
plan—undercutting “the union securities which [were] so important for existing members.”62 
While potentially bringing new minority workers into the workforce, labor leaders believed the 
plan would cause “a great deal of resentment among the people who are trying to do that real 
job”—existing union members.63 If contractors were obliged to hire untrained workers just to 
meet hiring goals, that could threaten the jobs of existing union members—people who in many 
cases spent years attempting to master their trade.  
 While labor leaders worried that the revised Philadelphia Plan would threaten union 
culture, rank-and-file union members opposed the Plan because they worried it would threaten 
their jobs. In the late 1960s, and into the early 1970s, it was growing increasingly difficult to 
remain in the middle class. The number of available well-paying blue-collar jobs was shrinking, 
being replaced instead by lower-class non-union jobs that required little training.  In the early 
1970s “stagflation—stagnant wages and rising prices—first reared its ugly head as the cost of 
living inched upward, accompanied by rising unemployment. The hard hats were hardest hit. By 
mid-1971, unemployment among construction workers stood at twice the national average with 
some trades edging toward 50 percent unemployment.”64 Consequently, “rank-and-file members 
of the building trades…the newest members of the affluent society…want[ed] to keep the door 
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closed to ‘outsiders’ to protect their jobs and pay scales.”65 For many rank-and-file union 
members, opposition to the Philadelphia Plan was not rooted in denying that fact that minorities 
“want[ed] their [fair] share of construction jobs.”66 Indeed, many “union leaders and the federal 
government want[ed] to give them a fair share” of jobs, but for the average union worker, 
stopping the revised Philadelphia Plan was a matter of self-preservation—a simple choice about 
limiting the competition for a shrinking number of well-paying middle class jobs.67  
 Aside from rank-and-file opposition that was rooted in practical economic considerations, 
many labor leaders opposed the revised Philadelphia Plan because they thought it to be an illegal 
quota—a gross expansion of government into the realm of private industry. According to C.J 
Haggerty, President of the AFL-CIO’s Building and Construction Trades Department, the hiring 
goals listed in the revised Philadelphia Plan represented a quota system that was not consistent 
with the intent of Executive Order 11246—an executive order first issued by President Kennedy 
and then reissued by President Nixon in conjunction with the rollout of his Philadelphia Plan.68 
Haggerty argued that the Nixon Administration should be mindful of the original intent of 
Kennedy’s executive order: 
“President Kennedy who issued the first Executive Order on discrimination in Federal 
employment and in private construction employment financed by the Federal 
Government was asked at a press conference in August 1963 what his views were 
with respect to the quota system. He explicitly rejected the idea and said among other 
things: ‘So, I don’t think we could undo the past…I don’t think quotas are a good 
idea...we’re too mixed a society of ours, to begin to divide ourselves in the basis of 
race or color.’” 
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In addition to violating the original intent of the Executive Order that was used by Nixon to 
justify the Philadelphia Plan’s goals, John Lyons, General President of the International 
Association of Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental Iron Workers—an association representing 
four Philadelphia-area unions impacted by Nixon’s Plan—argued that the Plan was also “illegal 
[because] it violate[d] the prohibition against quotas in the Civil Rights Act.”69 “Attempts to 
fulfill the suggested quotas,” according to Lyons, “w[ould] require job opportunity consideration 
based on race which is illegal and the very thing that the Civil Rights Act attempt[ed] to 
eliminate.”70 Even WTOP Radio—a respected Washington D.C. area radio station—read an 
editorial on-air to support labor’s position that the Philadelphia Plan was a quota. While the radio 
station recognized that “many craft unions…ha[d] an atrocious history of excluding blacks,” it 
still maintained that “there’s a lot of rationalizing going on in an attempt to make a ‘goal’ 
different from a ‘quota.’ As an illustration, The Washington Post decreed the employment floor 
[to be] acceptable. But a hiring requirement based on race is wrong—whatever the color, 
whatever it’s called.”71 Emboldened by a belief that Nixon’s plan violated a statutory prohibition 
against quotas, the AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades Department even filed an amicus 
curie brief in a 1970 court case that challenged the legality of the revised Philadelphia Plan, 
Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania and Morrissey, et al. v. The Secretary of 
Labor. In the brief, the AFL-CIO argued: 
“Petitioners believe that the Philadelphia Plan is violative of the Executive Order 
under which it purports to have been issued, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act and other applicable legislation. In having such a plan promulgated 
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and applied in violation of all such existing legislation, the rights of Petitioners, 
the collective bargaining of their members, the interests of individual members 
are all being improperly adversely affected.”72 
 
By writing an amicus curie brief arguing against the legality of Nixon’s plan, organized labor 
revealed the sincerity of its belief that not only was the Philadelphia Plan bad for rank-and-file 
union members, and not only did the Plan fail to provide a means to train black workers, but it 
established an illegal quota system that baselessly mandated the hiring of a predetermined 
number of black workers.  
The Civil Rights Movement: Underpinnings of Support 
 
 While organized labor, in its opposition to the revised Philadelphia Plan, claimed that the 
labor movement had made significant progress combating low minority employment levels, civil 
rights groups maintained that aggressive government action was needed to increase what they 
believed to be embarrassingly low levels of black employment in union trades. According to 
Delores Tucker, Vice President of the Pennsylvania NAACP, “black people have systematically 
been kept out of the building and construction trade industry, and the apprenticeship and 
journeymen programs.”73 Although “black people represent over 30% of the population” in 
Philadelphia, civil rights leaders lamented that African Americans made up “less than one-half of 
one-percent” of the membership in Philadelphia’s seven trade unions.74 The black employment 
picture in better-paying crafts was even bleaker. Even “Labor Department figures,” civil rights 
groups argued, “show[ed] that in many cities blacks comprise[d] less than two percent of the 
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workforce in the better-paid crafts.”75 And, black workers even accused the AFL-CIO of trying 
“to smother that fact with minority employment figures in other crafts, but these involve most 
dead-end or dying skills.”76 Tucker, and other civil rights leaders, including Herbert Hill, 
believed that low levels of black employment were not simply coincidental, but that “for 
generations there ha[d] been an unofficial quota system established by the discriminatory 
construction unions against the employment of black workers in the craft occupations.”77 To civil 
rights groups, the Philadelphia Plan was needed to eradicate systematic racial injustice within 
labor unions— “the unofficial quota system which rigidly enforced the exclusion or limitation of 
black workers from jobs in federally financed construction.”78  
 While organized labor argued that existing programs, including Operation Outreach, were 
successfully increasing black employment in union trades, civil rights groups maintained that the 
programs were ineffective, and therefore a more sweeping program like the revised Philadelphia 
Plan was needed to end decades of racial injustice. In Philadelphia, while “some industry unions 
and voices [were] asking for more time for internal reform” in the late 1960s, civil rights leaders 
posited that “during the entire history of these unions, internal reform has produced only 23 
black youths in apprenticeship programs of the seven unions cited by the government” of 
Philadelphia.79 Organized labor touted Operation Outreach as an effort that was successfully 
increasing black employment in trade unions, but civil rights leaders argued that “Outreach 
programs…[were], in fact, another device to perpetuate the racial status quo in the building 
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trades.”80 They noted that an examination “of data from the Manpower Administration of the 
U.S. Department of Labor reveals that well over half of all those in the Outreach programs 
[were] concentrated in the job classifications where, traditionally, there has always been a high 
percentage of black workers, such as, carpenters and the various towel trades or ‘mud jobs.’”81 
Moreover “in several cities, including Newark and Buffalo, black youth who graduated from 
Outreach apprenticeship programs and were certified as fully competent craftsmen [were still] 
denied journeymen membership status in several craft unions.”82 Consequently, even if these 
programs were effectively training black workers—a dubious assumption—employers were still 
not hiring them, or were giving them unsustainable short-term jobs, largely because hiring halls, 
“mechanism[s] for matching qualified workers with transient and frequently short-lived 
employment opportunities” in the construction trades, allowed for easy discrimination of 
prospective black employees.83 In a hiring hall, the dispatcher, often a white union official in 
charge of matching employee with employer, would “discriminatorily match jobs by referring 
his friends to the longer term jobs while sending other applicants to the shorter jobs.”84 And, 
many black workers that were indeed being trained and hired were being shuffled into trades that 
already had high levels of black employment—a practice that inhibited black workers’ ability to 
expand into new, potentially more lucrative trades.  
 
Even Labor Department programs that were designed to boost black hiring, according to 
civil rights leaders, were ineffective in their efforts to increase black representation in labor 
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unions. Soon after Nixon proposed the revised Philadelphia Plan, the Labor Department 
launched a program entitled, “home-town” solutions—an effort to persuade cities to develop 
plans that placed “hiring goals on businesses with federal contracts exceeding $50,000.”85 
Hometown solutions contained no enforcement mechanisms, and “employed negotiation and 
mediation rather than coercion and punishment.”86 To the chagrin of civil rights groups, “lacking 
funds and personnel, the Labor Department failed to police the mushrooming number of 
hometown plans.”87 Black leaders argued, “home-town solutions perpetuate control of entry into 
construction industry jobs by the building trades unions and employers who have a vested 
interest in maintaining the status quo. Continued control of job opportunities by the racist 
building trades unions is the heart of the matter.”88 Only by placing explicit obligations on 
employers—mandates to hire a certain number of black workers—would the Department of 
Labor be able to break the white racial hierarchy that excluded blacks from union ranks. 
Frustrated with the lack of progress made by the hometown solutions, and viewing the revised 
Philadelphia Plan as a program that had the potential to place a mandate to hire black workers on 
employers, civil rights groups decided to support Nixon’s Plan.    
Whereas organized labor believed the revised Philadelphia Plan to be an illegal quota, 
civil rights groups predicated their support for Nixon’s Plan on asserting that it was not illegal, 
but rather was merely one step that built on the goals of previously enacted legislation. In a letter 
to President Nixon in July 1969, Whitney Young, President of the National Urban League, an 
influential civil rights organization, argued that not only was the “affirmative action of the Labor 
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Department’s Philadelphia Plan…[the] first positive step of [the] new administration,” but that 
“it [was] in keeping with the equal opportunity compliance standard set by the federal 
government.”89 Young did not believe that Nixon’s Plan violated Civil Rights Act, but rather that 
the underpinnings of the Plan “[grew] out of already enacted legislation.”90 Thus, Young, 
speaking on behalf of the millions of African Americans affiliated with the National Urban 
League, argued that the “Philadelphia Plan should become model for rest of nation” and “should 
be put into effect in the rest of the country without delay.”91 Labor Secretary George Schultz 
corroborated Young’s argument that the Plan did not qualify as a quota, positing in a 1969 
interview that the hiring goals in the Plan were “really the kind of objective that you use in any 
kind of management process and are not a quota. A quota historically in this country has been a 
device for excluding people and these goals are devices you might say for including people.”92 
Conclusion 
 Closely aligned through the middle twentieth century, by the end of the 1960s, the 
partnership between organized labor and the civil rights movement began to fray. However, this 
fracturing alliance was only a microcosm of the quickly disintegrating Democratic coalition—the 
bond that had kept the Democrats largely in control of Congress and the White House since the 
New Deal.  Party realignment—engendered by a disappearing of the “solid south” and a 
backlash of middle-class whites against some aspects of 1960s liberalism—fueled the break-up 
of the Democratic coalition, and two of its central constituencies, civil rights and organized 
labor. By the time President Nixon introduced his revised Philadelphia Plan in late-1969, both 
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interest groups had determined that pursuing their own self-interests would be more fruitful than 
trying to preserve a dead coalition. Thus, civil rights and labor found themselves on opposite 
sides of a bruising political fight, with civil rights groups leading the charge in favor of Nixon’s 
plan to boost black representation in Philadelphia-area union trades, and organized labor fighting 
desperately to oppose a plan that they believed to be a threat to their culture and to the jobs of 
rank-and-file union members. Coalition politics was largely ignored in the fight over the 
implementation of the revised Philadelphia Plan. Instead, a politics of self-interest—a desire by 
both civil rights and organized labor to defend the interests of their constituents—illuminated 
what George Meany knew before his 1970 Labor Day Dinner at the White House: the 
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